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WHICH OLD WITCH?: A COMMENT

ON PROFESSOR PAULSEN'S LEMON IS
DEAD
Ira C. Lupu*

Professor Paulsen does not remember The Wizard of Oz very
well. At the conclusion of his Symposium remarks, he paraphrased
one of the film's more memorable lines - "Let the joyous word
be spread, Lemon v. Kurtzman at last is dead!"' In the film, the
original line leads to a delightful song and dance in which the
Munchkins celebrate the death of the Wicked Witch of the East.
Indeed, as the coroner tells us, "She's not only merely dead, she's
really most sincerely dead."2
The song ends on a sour note, however, as an evil-looking
crone, strongly resembling the one whose demise has produced
such gaiety, arrives on the scene. She explains that she is the
Wicked Witch of The West, the sister of the deceased. Westie
vows revenge upon Dorothy (and her little dog too) for causing
Eastie's death. It requires another ninety minutes, and a harrowing
journey to the Wizard, before Westie perishes in a Dorothy-driven
meltdown.
In his own analysis, Professor Paulsen seems to assume multiple roles. Like the Munchkins rejoicing at the death of the despised Wicked Witch of the East, he expresses abiding antipathy
toward the principles of Lemon v. Kurtzman3 and explicit glee at
the prospect of its demise. It comes as a surprise, therefore, when

Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of Law, National Law Center, The George
Washington University. This comment is based on remarks made at the symposium on
"Religion and Public Schools after Lee v. Weisman," at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law on November 13-15, 1992. I wish to thank all those involved for making
the symposium a fine experience.
1. Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 795, 799 (1993).
2. TH WITARD OF Oz (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
3. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:883

Paulsen turns out to be his own Wicked Witch of the West. He
advocates an alternative principle which produces results that are
more separationist than most of those produced by the Rehnquist
Court. Paulsen accepts the outcome in Lee v. Weisman4 and proposes an attractive and expansive theory of coercion as a substitute
for Lemon.
Whether Professor Paulsen accepts the implications of his
principle is another story. Perhaps he also wants to play a third
role in the picture: in a manner reminiscent of the Wizard of Oz
himself, he hides Establishment Clause insensitivity behind an
illusion to the contrary.
I.

LEMON LEFTOVERS

Before describing the features of the West Witch Professor
Paulsen creates after his interment of Lemon, let me join in Professor Conkle's argument5 that Lemon - Eastie herself - is far
from dead. Despite all the signs that the Supreme Court is not
following Lemon rigorously,6 lower courts continue to cite and
rely upon it regularly.7
Furthermore, this Term's anticipated decision in Zobrest v.

4. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
5. Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865 (1993).
6. See Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743,
762-68 (1992) (discussing the decline of the regime of separationism associated with Lemon). Writing before Lee v. Weisman, I was previously too pessimistic about the future of
separationism: Justices Kennedy and Souter have both surprised me.
7. See, e.g., Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1171 (7th Cir.
1993) (relying on Lemon to prohibit a public school system from permitting representatives of Gideon International to distribute Bibles in public schools); Bishop v. Aronov,
926 F.2d 1066, 1077 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992) (applying
Lemon to find that a state university's prohibition of an assistant professor's teaching
voluntary religious classes did not itself create an establishment of religion by disfavoring
Christianity); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1056 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992) (upholding a school district's directive requiring a teacher to
remove certain religious books from his classroom); Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist.,
862 F.2d 824, 832 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989) (invalidating a plan of
random selection of speakers to give pre-game invocations because the plan had a religious purpose and the primary effect of advancing religion); Doe v. Human, 725 F. Supp.
1503, 1506-07 (W.D. Ark. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991) (applying Lemon
to find that voluntary Bible classes at elementary school unconstitutionally advance religion); Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331, 345 (N.D.
Iowa 1989) (invalidating an invocation and benediction at a public high school graduation
under the Lemon test). But see Albright v. Board of Educ., 765 F. Supp. 682, 689 (D.
Utah 1991) (suggesting that the Supreme Court may soon abandon the Lemon test).
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Catalina Foothills School Districts is unlikely to overturn Lemon,
explicitly or otherwise. In Zobrest, the Ninth Circuit upheld a
state's refusal, grounded on the Establishment Clause, to supply a
state-employed sign language interpreter to accompany and aid a
parochial school child with severe hearing impairment. 9 Had the
student attended public school or a private nonreligious school, the
state would have supplied the interpreter.1" Zobrest is likely to
turn on two factual considerations: first, the h terpreter is a state
employee; second, the interpreter will become significantly involved
in the religious portion of the student's education. Such an arrangement is tantamount to directly supplying a state-employed religion
teacher for the school's use with particular students. Under longprevailing law, the state cannot directly aid and involve itself in
the religious component of parochial education." It seems highly
unlikely that a majority of the Supreme Court will abandon such a
fundamental and well-settled legal principle, even in a case with
facts as sympathetic as these.
The only way to avoid the constitutional dilemma in Zobrest
is for the state to provide aid directly to the student's family for
the interpreter's services. If the program were structured in this
way, with the family free to choose an accredited school and to
employ the interpreter, the state's relationship with the religious
outcome would be sufficiently attenuated to escape Establishment

8. 963 F.2d 1190 (9thi Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1192.
11. In prior decisions striking down state aid to parochial schools, either in the form
of teaching personnel or funds to pay such personnel, the state took great pains to limit
direct aid to secular subjects. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 407 (1985) (public employees teaching educationally deprived children in parochial schools instructed to
avoid involvement with religious activities in the schools and to ban religious materials
from their classrooms); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 378 (1985)
(requiring nonpublic school classrooms in which nonpublic school students were taught at
public expense to be free of any type of religious symbols and directing teachers using
these classrooms to post signs reading "public school classroom"); Earley v. DiCenso, 403
U.S. 602, 607-08 (1971) (imposing restrictions, designed to minimize the likelihood of
religious content of state-suibsidized instruction, upon the eligibility of teachers of secular
subjects in nonpublic elementary schools for a state salary supplement program); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1971) (conditioning direct state reimbursement to
nonpublic schools for certain -secular educational services" upon fulfillment of specific
statutory criteria). Nevertheless, all such aid programs were constitutionally inadequate
because the schools could not guarantee that there would be no spill-over religious uses,
or because the state's attempts to prevent such spill-over effects created entanglement
problems. Zobrest is striking in its absence of such state efforts to limit aid to secular
subjects.
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Clause condemnation.12 Current federal and Arizona law may not
permit this arrangement in any school, however, and the Establishment Clause prohibition against favoring religion over nonreligion
presumably mandates that the program be structured no more favorably in religious schools than others. The Court in Zobrest
therefore cannot order Arizona to create an aid program limited to
parochial schools as a way of solving the constitutional problems
in the case: such an order would simply substitute one Establishment Clause violation for another.
Whatever the result in Zobrest, Lemon's three component requirements will survive, even if in a different form than that which
prevailed in the 1970's. Lemon's first requirement is that state
action must have a secular purpose.13 This requirement is nothing
more than a particularization of the general obligation that legislation be designed to pursue constitutionally permissible ends. 4
Religious accommodations are occasionally required by the Constitution for secular reasons. 5 When not required, however, such
accommodations are frequently forbidden because they discriminate,
in favor of religious association and expression and against their
analogous nonreligious counterparts. 6 The death of Lemon will
not change these general nondiscrimination requirements, nor will it

12. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489
(1986) (providing financial aid through a state vocational rehabilitation program to a visually impaired student at a Christian college, for training as a pastor, missionary, or youth
director, does not advance religion in a manner inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983) (holding that a state tax deduction
for educational expenses, including expenses of parochial school, does not violate the
Establishment Clause).
13. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
14. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (noting that the secular purpose requirement concerns whether the actual purpose of the government is to "endorse or
disapprove" of religion).
15. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987)
(acknowledging that the governnfent may, and sometimes must, accommodate religion and
that this may be done without an Establishment Clause violation).
16. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989) (holding that a state
sales tax exemption for religious publications violated the Establishment Clause because it
denied similar benefits to nonreligious publications, lacked a secular objective to justify its
preference, and had the overall effect of endorsing religion). But see Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987) (commenting that in order for a law
to have "forbidden" effects, a fair assessment must demonstrate that the government itself
has advanced religion "through its own activities and influence"). See generally Ira C.
Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555 (1991) (discussing religious accommodation
and concluding that it should be permitted only when constitutionally required).
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eliminate the prohibition on purposeful government advancement of
a sectarian creed.
The second requirement of Lemon focuses on how the challenged government action advances or inhibits religion.17 This "effects" focus may be subject to larger changes, but these will be
refinements rather than abandonments. In cases involving religious
symbols, the doctrinal dispute revolves around an approach based
on "coercion," as developed in Weisman, and one based on "endorsement." 8 The former is concerned with state pressure to conform, while the latter focuses upon a person's sense of exclusion
from the religious norms of the community Although these approaches diverge in some cases, both examine the effects of state
practices.
In cases involving financial assistance to religious institutions
as part of a larger, more inclusive program of state assistance, it is
not clear whether or how Zobrest may modify the Lemon effects
test. Most probably, state assistance directly to religious organizations, without insulation from purely theological aspects of the
enterprise, will continue to be constitutionally unacceptable.' 9 Call
that "forbidden effects" or what you will,20 it still remains a bedrock First Amendment principle.
The third requirement of Lemon prohibits excessive interaction
between government and religion.2 1 The future of this "entanglement" doctrine is difficult to predict because its constitutional basis
has always been uncertain. Joint ventures of various lands between
state and religious institutions will remain constitutionally troublesome whatever doctrinal formulation surrounds them. Indeed, in
finding state involvement which exceeded permissible limits under
the Establishment Clause, Weisman itself emphasized the state
direction and control over the choice of clergy and the content of
the prayer.'
17. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
18. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 & n.47 (1989) (declining
to utilize a coercion inquiry and commenting that the Court's task was to determine
whether the public display of a creche and a menorah had the effect of endorsing or
disapproving religious beliefs); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984)
(O'Connor, I., concurring) (advocating and explaining the use of the endorsement approach).
19. Cf.supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20. See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 395 (1985) (holding that
a state's educational programs providing classes for nonpublic school students in nonpublic
school classrooms at public expense had the forbidden effect of advancing religion).
21. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
22. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) (stating that when a public school
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Here as elsewhere, constitutional law is more likely to display
new bottles than new wine. If the question Professor Paulsen is
addressing is whether Lemon qua Lemon will ever again be relied
upon by a majority to reach an anti-government result in the Supreme Court, then the answer is likely no. On the other hand, if
the question is whether Lemon will continue to influence lower
court decisions, or whether Lemon themes will retain significant
vitality in Establishment Clause doctrine, then the answer is surely
yes. Professor Paulsen's beer winnings were not illgotten.'
IX. THEORIES OF COERCION -

THE PROFESSOR VS. THE COURT

The breadth of Professor Paulsen's theory of coercion delighted and surprised me. His proposed principle hints at an approach
broader than, and superior to, the Supreme Court's methodology
for resolving problems of governmental promotion of religion. Professor Paulsen's theory is certainly more expansive than the Court's
opinion in Lee v. Weisman,24 authored by Justice Kennedy.
Professor Paulsen advances the following Establishment Clause
principle:
Government may not, through direct legal sanction (or
threat thereof) or as a condition of some other right, benefit, or privilege, require individuals to engage in acts of
religious exercise, worship, expression or affirmation, nor
may it require individuals to attend or give their direct and
personal financial support to a church or religious body or
25
ministry.
He concludes that the graduation prayer in Weisman violated that
principle because it conditioned the benefit or privilege of participation at graduation upon "attendance at a religious worship cerede minimis one, . . . [and regardless of]
mony, even [a] ...
whether or not one is 26forced further to participate in particular acts
of religious worship."
Justice Kennedy offered a far narrower formulation in Weisman

official makes a decision regarding an invocation and a benediction, it is a choice attributable to the state). For further analysis of this aspect of the Court's opinion, see Conkle,
supra note 5, at 876.
23. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 796-97.
24. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
25. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 797 (emphasis removed).
26. Id. at 799.

1993]

RELIGIONAND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

as the basis for the Court's opinion:
These dominant facts mark and control the confines of
our decision: State officials direct the performance of a
formal religious exercise at promotional and graduation
ceremonies for secondary schools. Even for those students
who object to the religious exercise, their attendance and
participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are in
a fair and real sense obligatory, though the school district
does not require attendance as a condition for receipt of the
diploma.2'
No one in the Weisman majority, other than Justice Kennedy,
is willing to be limited to coercion, however defined, as the exclusive Establishment Clause principle. Contrary to Professor Paulsen's
assertion, moreover, not even those Justices who joined in Justice Scalia's dissent are prepared to accept Scalia's narrower version of coercion as the exclusive principle of the Establishment
Clause. Rather, the dissent emphasizes the permissibility of traditional "nonsectarian" religious ceremony in the nation's public
life.29 Only Justice Kennedy focuses on coercion, and even he
recognizes the additional limitation that government may not "par-

27. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. Justice Kennedy also described why attendance at
graduation was "voluntary" only in the weakest sense:
There was a stipulation in the District Court that attendance at
graduation and promotional ceremonies is voluntary. Petitioners and the United
States, as amicus, made this a center point of the case, arguing that the option
of not attending the graduation excuses any inducement or coercion in the
ceremony itself. The argument lacks all persuasion. Law reaches past formalism.
Aid to say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school
graduation is formalistic in the extreme. True, Deborah could elect not to attend
commencement without renouncing her diploma; but we shall not allow the
case to turn on this point. Everyone knows that in our society and in our
culture high school graduation is one of life's most significant occasions. A
school rule which excuses attendance is beside the point. Attendance may not
be required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a student is not free to
absent herself form the graduation exercise in any real sense of the term "voluntary," for absence would require forfeiture of those intangible benefits which
have motivated the student through youth and all her high school years. Graduation is a time for family and those closest to the student to celebrate success
and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all to the end of impressing upon the young person the role that it is his or her right and duty to
assume in the community and all of its diverse parts.
Id. at 2659 (citation omitted).
28. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 825 ('[The four dissenters in Weisman joined Kennedy
in agreeing that the proper inquiry is coercion.").
29. Weisman, 112 S. CL at 2679-80.
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ticipate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do
So. i ,0

Thus, Professor Paulsen is all alone. His view of coercion
differs from that of everyone on the Court, and none of the Justices accepts his assertion that coercion is a necessary element of
an Establishment Clause violation. Along with Charles Cooper who
argued Weisman for the Providence School Board, perhaps Professor Paulsen does not believe that the Establishment Clause forbids
printing "In Jesus Christ We Trust" or "Allah Be Praised" on the
realm's coin,3M but no one on the Supreme Court appears to share
that view.
In every respect, the differences between Professor Paulsen and
the Court in Weisman are significant. The Court describes the
prayer in Weisman as "a formal religious exercise[,]" 32 while
Paulsen is more broadly concerned with "acts of religious exercise,
worship, expression or affirmation. " 33 More significantly, the
Court views graduation attendance as having the character of obligation and suggests that this quasi-obligatory character is crucial to
the conclusion that participation is coercive. In contrast, Professor
Paulsen broadens the Establishment Clause trigger to include acts
of religious exercise which the state requires as a condition of any
right, benefit, or privilege.
These distinctions mark the lines between the Court's miserly
approach to the Establishment Clause and the far more generous
one suggested by Professor Paulsen. 34 Consider the problem of
religious holiday symbols displayed by public officials on public
property. The Court has divided along several dimensions in such

30. Id. at 2655 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
31. See Nat Hentoff, Will the Wall Between Church and State Come Tumbling Down?,
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1991, at A19 (describing Mr. Cooper's response to a question
posed by Justice Scalia about the implications of petitioner's argument that the Establishment Clause only forbids government coercion of religious belief); Ruth Marcus, Prayer
Case Tests Court's Law on Religion, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1991, at A3 (same).
32. 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
33. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 797 (emphasis removed).
34. I say "suggested by" because both his essay and his remarks at the symposium indicate that Professor Paulsen resists many of the implications his view supports. For example, he was surprised by my assertion that his view undercuts Lynch, 465 U.S. 668,
and his essay intimates that Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1988),
were wrongly decided. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 803 n.26, 852-55. Each of the latter
three involves some form of religious coercion.
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cases, 35 and it is not clear that any view currently commands a
majority. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 6 Justice Kennedy
authored a significant opinion taking a broad view of state power
to acknowledge religious holidays with symbolic displays.37 In
particular, he concluded that a publicly sponsored display of the
nativity scene in the main foyer of a county courthouse did not
violate the Establishment Clause.3 8
Does Weisman suggest that Justice Kennedy has changed his
approach to such cases? Justice Scalia thinks so, 39 but apparently
Justice Kennedy does not.4 0 Justice Kennedy presumably would
distinguish graduation prayer from holiday displays (even in courthouse foyers) on several grounds. First, the presence of the creche
is not coercive because extended presence in the foyer is not "in a
fair and real sense obligatory." 4" Rather, one can avert one's eyes
from the creche while passing through the foyer on the way to
one's real place of business in the courthouse. Second, courthouses
are for adults more than for impressionable youths. Third, the
crache is passive; unlike a member of the clergy speaking at a
large official gathering, the cr6che is not self-solemnifying.
Whether or not these distinctions are constitutionally sufficient,
none of them is available to Professor Paulsen. In the setting of
Allegheny, all those who seek the public benefit of use of the
courthouse must view the cr6che.4 2 Paulsen cannot rely on the
adult-youth distinction because he rejects psychological theories of
coercion. 43 Nor can he make the "avert your eyes" argument per-

35. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (determining by divided
opinion the constitutionality of a creche and a menorah display); Lynch, 465 U.S. 668
(determining the constitutionality of a cr6che display and producing a split opinion).
36. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
37. Id. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
38. Id. at 655.
39. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (Scalia, I., dissenting) (explaining
that joining Justice Kennedy's opinion in Allegheny precludes him from joining Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Weisman).
40. In Weisman, Justice Kennedy cited his opinion in Allegheny and gave no indication
that he considered the two to be inconsistent. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
41. Id. at 2655.
42. There is no doubt that courthouses, including their foyers, built and maintained at
public expense, constitute a public benefit. For civil and criminal defendants, attendance at
the courthouse may be coercive, in response to subpoena or arrest. Perhaps Justice Kennedy would fall back on the availability of an alternative entrance into the courthouse.
There is some symbolism for you: -Attention nonbelievers, please enter the courthouse
through the basement."
43. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 833. The main target of Professor Paulsen's criticism
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suasively; Deborah Weisman could have averted her eyes and
plugged her ears, but Paulsen does not find these options to be
sufficient.' If they were, then the school prayer cases would have
to be overruled; the Scalia Four would reach this result, but Professor Paulsen, Justice Kennedy, and the remaining Justices would
not.
The active-passive distinction is the only way Professor Paulsen
can save public display of the creche from his own condemnation.
Paulsen would be forced to argue that presence of the creche does
not constitute a "worship ceremony" in the same way as spoken
prayer. However, visual symbols can invite worship or devotion
more powerfully than spoken prayer. For example, compare a
school teacher opening class by softly speaking the words "Yea
God" with the Eastertime display on the courthouse lawn of a
twenty-foot high, artistically powerful sculpture of Christ suffering
crucifixion.45 Would Professor Paulsen find the former to be coerced attendance at religious worship but not the latter?
Alternatively, Professor Paulsen might rely on the context in a
larger sense. Graduations can be solemn occasions; audiences take
them seriously and are essentially captives to the social circumstances. Courthouse foyers, by contrast, are filled with hustle and
bustle; not everyone will stop and reflect upon the creche or other
holiday symbols.
Professor Paulsen's methodology cannot succeed, however, if
its central focus is on the likelihood that people will notice (and
therefore "attend") the symbol. This approach cannot escape the
problems of subjectivity. Some people may not notice creches or
feel compelled to attend to their message, but others are acutely
aware of the presence of religious symbols in public places. The
problem of subjectivity is one from which Professor Paulsen promised to spare us.46 Indeed, after his extended critique of Lemon,

of Weisman's peer pressure analysis is the imputation of private action to the state. Id.
However, he joins in Justice Scalia's sneer at Justice Kennedy for relying on amateur
psychology to interpret the Constitution. See id.; Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2681 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("interior decorating is a rock-hard science compared to psychology practiced
by amateurs[;] . . . the Court has gone beyond the realm where judges know what they
are doing").
44. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 831 n.126.
45. Cf.Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Schs., No. 4:92-CV-146, 1993 WL 25381, at
*7 (W.D. Mich., Feb. 3, 1993) (holding that public schools may not display a portrait of
Christ in a hallway).
46. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 846.
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he gives short shrift to the "endorsement" principle, coercion's real
rival as the reigning approach to Establishment Clause problems. 7
His critique of endorsement is not normative; he does not challenge its central premise that the Establishment Clause prohibits the
government from sending messages which divide the community
into insiders and outsiders.48 Rather, he echoes the complaints of
others that the endorsement test is hopelessly subjective.4 9 If Professor Paulsen is to distinguish the cr6eche and cross cases from
Weisman persuasively he must demonstrate how his coercion theory
is any less subjective than its rivals in the field.
Whatever criticisms one might make of Professor Paulsen's
approach, it is superior to that offered by Justice Kennedy." The

47. Id. at 815-16.
48. See Lynch v. Donnelly,-465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, I., concurring) (stating that government actions endorsing religion "make religion relevant, in reality or public
perception, to status in the political community").
49. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 815-16. See generally Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the 'No Endorsement" Test,
86 MiCH. L. REV. 266 (1987) (criticizing the endorsement test as indeterminate); Michael
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CI. L. REv. 115, 147-57
(1992) (making similar criticism).
50. A theory which requires coercion as a necessary element of an Establishment
Clause violation can never go far enough. The appropriate response to this narrow view
of the Establishment Clause is that it would make the Establishment Clause duplicative of
the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion:
Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37 (1991).
Professor Paulsen responds by arguing that the Free Exercise Clause protects religious believers against interference with their religious practices, while the Establishment Clause
protects everyone against the coercive imposition of belief or practice by government.
Paulsen, supra note 1, at 843 n.171. This response is unpersuasive; freedom of speech,
for instance, protects individuals against both compelled speech and interference with their
own speech. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (prohibiting New
Hampshire from requiring individuals to display the state motto, which was repugnant to
their moral, religious and political beliefs, on their license plates); West Va. Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that the state cannot compel students to
salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance). Thus, it is reasonable to believe that
the Free Exercise Clause similarly protects both believers and nonbelievers against compelled religious exercise. The Establishment Clause must have a function other than protecting individuals against compelled religious exercise; otherwise, the Clause becomes
superfluous.
In my opinion, the better argument for Paulsen is that both Religion Clauses outlaw
only coercion but are remedially distinct; the Free Exercise Clause supports exemptions
for religious individuals, while the Establishment Clause supports ihjunctions against religious practices by government. However, on closer inspection, the remedial argument
drags the substantive proposition down with it. The clauses generate remedial differences
because their underlying substantive theories differ, the Establishment Clause goes beyond
coercion and extends to unions between the state and religion; such unions cannot be
cured adequately by exemptions for complaining individuals.
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former, if honestly applied, is likely to catch more constitutional
violations than the latter. Weisman gives us a rule for public
schools: it is another school prayer case, and little else.
I.

PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE COERCION

The most school-specific focus for Professor Paulsen's coercion
theory revolves around questions concerning the identity of the
coercer. Professor Paulsen argues that official school sponsorship of
religious ceremonies is always constitutionally troublesome.5 At
the other extreme, he asserts that voluntary, student-initiated religious activities at school are private actions which are not constitutionally questionable.52 The hard cases in between involve on-premises teacher behavior, with its attendant mix of private and public
53
features.
I agree with Professor Paulsen's ranking of these problems, but
they are not as categorically distinct as Professor Paulsen would
have us believe. Furthermore, we should not tolerate religion-promoting teacher behavior to the extent Professor Paulsen suggests.
Paulsen's attempt to catalogue sources of coercion aimed at
public school students raises two difficulties. The less important
problem is that state compulsion places students in the path of
whatever other students choose to throw at them. If student coercion of others is criminal or tortious, and school officials have
reason to know about such misbehavior, the officials may be required to intervene or else be held liable. Of course, this concern
is limited to extreme methods of proselytizing. Further, this concern is not religion-specific: outrageous forms of religious, political,
sexual, social or other harassment by students should trigger the
same responsibilities.
The more significant problem, specific to the Establishment
Clause, is that of joint ventures between religious students and
their allies in the faculty or administration. The image of pious
students praying quietly on their own before school begins is
untroubling, as would be heated nonviolent lunch-time conversation
between religious zealots and others in the student cafeteria. A
different image is projected, however, by high school cheerleaders
prompting a prayer from the stands during half-time at the football

51. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 848.
52. Id. at 849-52.
53. See id.
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game.' This might be purely private behavior, without official
sponsorship of any kind, or it might be the result of collaboration
with, and active encouragement by, the football coaches, the school
administration, or others in official power. Such joint ventures are
no different in principle than the invalid prayer in Weisman, but
because the cooperation may be clandestine rather than open, its
existence will be more difficult to prove.
Professor Paulsen and I differ with respect to teacher behavior
in contexts where the teacher's official position provides an opportunity to proselytize or otherwise coerce students. Professor Paulsen
is correct at the extreme; teachers are constitutionally entitled to
follow their own obligatory religious practices. Just because a
teacher's religion may be compatible with that of some students
but incompatible with that of others is an insufficient reason to
force teachers to neuter themselves religiously. Teachers should be
free, for example, to wear religious emblems or garb as required
by their faiths.
In cases where teachers go beyond the requirements of their
faith in bringing religion to the classroom, however, the dangers
become more serious. Here, I believe the line should be drawn
with more Establishment Clause sensitivity than Professor Paulsen
displays. Consider the anecdote, told to me by a professor at another law school, of a Mississippi public school teacher who inquired of her fourth grade students on the first day of classes
whether each of them had yet accepted the Lord Jesus Christ as
his Saviour. Does posing the question itself, without regard to the
manner in which it is asked, violate the Establishment Clause?
Based on Professor Paulsen's remarks about religious privacy, there
is reason to believe he would think that asking the question in
such a context offends the Constitution. 55
The case of Roberts v. Madigan,56 discussed by Professor
Paulsen, illustrates the difficulty arising in cases of in-class manifestations of religious convictions by teachers. As Professor Paulsen
describes, principal Madigan ordered teacher Roberts to remove the

54. Cf. lager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 832-33 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989) (holding that an "equal access" plan through which lay
speakers were randomly selected to deliver pre-game invocations violated the Establishment
Clause because it permitted religious invocations instead of requiring wholly secular inspirational speeches).
55. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 847 (commenting that individuals have a right to
religious privacy and cannot be required to identify their affiliations or beliefs in public).
56. 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 3025 (1992).
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Bible from his desktop and to refrain from reading the Bible during each day's fifteen minute silent reading period.57 If these had
been all of the relevant facts, I would agree with Professor
Paulsen's conclusion that Roberts was acting within his rights and"
that the principal overreacted to the Establishment Clause danger
that Roberts was teaching religion.
Curiously, Professor Paulsen fails to mention three critical
facts. First, the lawsuit alleged that principal Madigan removed the
Bible from the school library, not just from the classroom.58 If
true, this bespeaks the sort of anti-religious, bureaucratic zealotry
that is separationism at its worst. The Bible is thought by many to
be one of the world's great and most influential works of literature, and it deserves library space on these grounds.
The other facts omitted from Professor Paulsen's discussion,
however, cut the other way. Teacher Roberts placed a poster on his
classroom wall which read, "You have only to open your eyes to
see the hand of God."59 Principal Madigan ordered the poster removed, and Roberts did not contest this decision. Roberts also
maintained a classroom library of over two hundred books, including The Bible in Pictures and The Life of Jesus.' The principal
ordered these two books removed from the classroom, and this
order remained a central point of dispute throughout the litigation.
With these facts in place, the Roberts story becomes more
problematic. Mr. Roberts was not simply given to reading the

57. Id. at 1049-50.
58. There was a dispute concerning whether in fact the principal had removed the
Bible from the library. Ma.at 1050. In any event, school officials stipulated at trial that
the Bible would be replaced and not removed again. Id.
59. Id. at 1049.
60. The Court of Appeals described these books as follows:
The Bible in Pictures is a 320-page volume with over one thousand
illustrations. The illustrations are designed to provide both children and adults
with a better understanding of the Bible. In the book's preface, the author
states: "I pray that this book may bring a fresh vision of Christ, and God's
purpose in Him, to you who now read it in the midst of the heartache and
frustration of our modem world."
The Story of Jesus is a 128-page volume that depicts through illustrations and text the birth, life, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The book concentrates on the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth with the underlying premise that
he is the Son of God.
Id at 1049 'n.2. Teacher Roberts compiled the library "over his nineteen years of teaching." Id. at 1049. While the opinion does not state definitively whether Roberts owned all
the books in this collection, the books in controversy were clearly Roberts's personal
property. Ma.at 1057.
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Bible in his spare time. He was apparently a deeply religious man,
who communicated that commitment to his students in a variety of
ways, including reading choices, pictorial displays, and inclusions
in the class library. Does this account suggest a threat to Establishment Clause policies designed to protect citizens, especially children, from the use of an official position to advance particular
religious faiths?
To be sure, nothing in the record indicates coercion of any
student. The class library also contained works on Indian religion
and Greek mythology (but not Islam or Judaism), and the wall
poster was "nonsectarian" as that term is now used euphemistically
to describe America's so-called civil religion. 61 Nevertheless, a
principal who has received complaints about such a teacher might
well act to forestall what seems to be an actual or imminent Establishment Clause violation. If the principal acts correctly, she is a
wise administrator; if she acts rigidly or inappropriately, she is a
bureaucratic tyrant.
The Roberts tale provides several larger lessons about the problem of religious expression by teachers in public schools. First,
most obviously, the constitutional dividing line between a teacher's
private, protected conduct and abuse of his official position is
difficult to establish. An unobtrusive religious symbol worn as
jewelry should always be acceptable, but spontaneous spoken
prayer in the middle of class should not be. There is a wide grey
area between these two extremes.
Second, more subtly, Roberts involved a school principal utilizing constitutional values in administration, rather than a lawsuit by
a student or parent against the school system. In this context, the
principal need not get the Establishment Clause point "exactly
right." Rather, she should be free - up to the point of conflicting
teacher rights, which I do not believe were strongly implicated in
,Roberts - to err on the side of overenforcement of the Establishment Clause.
Indeed, for several reasons, such overenforcement is bureaucratically appropriate, as well as courageous. First, if the principal
allows teachers to engage in conduct approaching constitutional
boundaries, some will surely cross the line. That this may give rise
to litigation should be only a secondary concern; the primary focus

61. Id. at 1055; see supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's
dissent in Weisman).
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should be on the question of which values the Constitution is
designed to promote, and at what (and whose) expense. Among
other things, such a focus would promote civic education for students and others in the community.
In addition, overenforcement by administrators is a salutary
counterweight to the likelihood of unwillingness by students and
their parents to enforce the Establishment Clause through litigation.
Litigation is always expensive, stressful, or both; within small
communities, Establishment Clause litigation is unusually divisive
and difficult for families who have the courage to pursue it. Courts
cannot readily cure the problem of underenforcement, but administrators can assist in a reasonable manner.62
This analysis of personnel behavior on religious matters in
public schools is tied to the much larger constitutional question
regarding the relationship between parental and governmental authority in the rearing of children. Our constitutional strategy for
protecting adults against governmental oppression involves, among
other things, the deployment of enforceable rights against governmental action. However, children are not ordinarily in a position to
assert their own rights; they typically depend upon others - parents, teachers, juvenile authorities, social workers, etc. - to protect
them from abuse, oppression, coercion, and exploitation. In other
words, our constitutional strategy for protecting children is one of
separation of powers; rather than assign rights to children directly,
we assign overlapping but fragmented authority over them to parties who are in competition for children's attention, respect, emulation, and approval.63
Only with respect to religious upbringing does our constitutional arrangement depart from this model of separated power over
children. Our constitutional principles guarantee parents that the
state will not directly compete with their choice of religious training. Parents may choose private religious schooling or public
schooling; when they choose the latter, they should feel as safe as
possible that no one is condemning their religion or indoctrinating
62. See George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public
School Students, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 707, 741 (1993) (commenting that administrative action can mitigate or eliminate the divisiveness of constitutional litigation); see also
discussion infra Part IV (dealing with administrative discretion to implement Religion
Clause values).
63. See generally Ira C. Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation
of Powers, 67 B.U. L. REv. 971 (1987) (defending state policies designed to divide power over children by forbidding home education, even if motivated by religious choice).
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their children in some alternative faith. While it is impossible for
children to attend public school in a pluralistic society without
some competition from secular norms, and exposure to alternative
religious ideas, it is consistent with the constitutional structure for
administrators, teachers, and courts to minimize the competition
between family and state on matters of religious choice.
Professor Paulsen is sensitive to these concerns about power
and authority in public institutions, but he seems ambivalent about
the role of the Establishment Clause in policing them. Despite his
offer of a promising theory, Professor Paulsen at times seems overly committed to a conception of Religion Clause unity in which
the clauses are "two sides of the same coin" of religious liberty.'
This conception systematically undervalues concerns about religious
equality and freedom from imposition of state-sponsored religion,
whether imposed through coercion or otherwise.
IV.

THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND ZONES OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCRETION

The above analysis of Roberts v. Madigan indicates that administrators or other nonjudicial personnel may have broad discretion
to address Religion Clause matters. Elsewhere I have written that
Free Exercise exemptions from rules which are formally religionneutral should emerge only from the process of adjudication.65 My
current approval of administrative power to overenforce the Establishment Clause, when compared with my previous condemnation
of nonadjudicative enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause, suggests that I am as one-sided in my view of the Religion Clauses as
Professor Paulsen, with the clause priority reversed.
Similarly, Professor Dent's symposium essay argues that my
preference for adjudication alone to accommodate free exercise
concerns is flawed on other grounds.66 In particular, Dent argues
that if only courts can accommodate religion, collusive free exercise suits between accommodation-seekers and receptive officials
64. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 843 n.171; see also Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 3 (arguing that an interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause must- be based on religious liberty in order
to distinguish between permissible accommodations and impermissible establishments);
Richard L Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 620,
626-27 (1992) (stating that there is only one Religion Clause and that there is neither
conflict, nor need for balancing, between free exercise and establishment).
65. Lupu, supra note 16, at 600-09.
66. Dent, supra note 62, at 739-42.
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will result.67
I continue to believe that discretionary accommodations of
religion are substantively unacceptable, no matter which official
agency makes them.68 The criticism from Dent and others, however, has led me to reconsider the question of administrative power
to accommodate religion in cases where the Constitution arguably
requires it.
The danger associated with non-judicial accommodation is that
of religious favoritism and inequality - accommodating the strong,
popular, well-financed, or nonthreatening religions, but not others
equally entitled to such accommodation under the Constitution.
Legislative accommodations of particular religions or practices
present a stark danger of this kind of favoritism, and I continue to
oppose any doctrine that would permit legislative exemptions for
specified sects or specific religious practices.
In an administrative setting, however, the danger of unconstitutional discrimination can be controlled by the same means used to
check such discrimination in other First Amendment matters. The
key control is procedural regularity. Administrators seeking to
determine which religious accommodation claims to honor and
which to reject should operate under specific, published, nondiscriminatory standards.69 Furthermore, denials of accommodation
should be subject to expedited judicial review in the same fashion
as denials of parade permits or other licenses to engage in expressive activity.70 Under such arrangements, administrators should be
allowed to consider claims for mandatory accommodations.

67. Id.
68. See Lupu, supra note 16, at 611 ("When the Constitution requires such treatment,
courts should fearlessly order it; but whatever is not required is presumptively proscribed. . .).
69. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) (reversing conviction under a
state statute forbidding obstruction of public passages because the statute gave local authorities uncontrolled discretion); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (upholding a state statute prohibiting unlicensed public parades because the licensing provisions conferred only limited authority on the licensing entity and provided for systematic
and consistent treatment).
70. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 229 (1990) (invalidating a
municipal licensing scheme for sexually oriented businesses because it failed to provide
adequate procedural safeguards, including prompt judicial review of denials); Carroll v.
President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968) (overturning a restraining order against public rallies because the order was obtained without notice in an
ex parte proceeding incompatible with the First Amendment); Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965) (invalidating state censorship procedure which failed to provide
adequate procedural safeguards, including prompt judicial review).
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Although such a regime would not eliminate all invidious discrimination from administrative decisions, it would help to reduce
the operation of such prejudice. This emphasis on procedure is
consistent with the program proposed by the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act,7 ' which would require all government
decisionmakers to operate under general and uniform substantive
standards. Preferably, the Act. should be amended to include additional procedural requirements of the type described above. Due
process of the Religion Clauses is always worth explicit attention,
although such concerns are frequently overshadowed by substantive
passions concerning the general subject of religion and state.
Having partially recanted my view of administrative power and
Religion Clause decisionmaking, do I remain caught in the trap of
biased Establishment Clause priority because I favor administrative
overenforcement of that Clause but no more than precise enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause? I do not think so. In my opinion, discretionary religious accommodations are forbidden by constitutional requirements of equality - religious, associational, and
moral. Consequently, administrators cannot accommodate beyond
what the Constitution requires.
The Religion Clauses do not, however, operate similarly in the
other direction. In some circumstances, administrators may
overenforce the Establishment Clause without violating the Free
Exercise Clause; sometimes they should do precisely that. The
discretionary constitutional zone created by the Religion Clauses is
not the famous zone of permissible accommodation;72 rather, it is
that of permissible Establishment Clause concern by public officials. Within that area of concern, general standards, and sensitive
processes through which those standards are applied, should minimize invidious discrimination and other constitutional errors.
When administration of those Establishment Clause concerns
tramples on the Free Exercise Clause or other constitutional rights

71. H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The Act died in the 102d Congress but
was reintroduced in the 103d Congress. S. 578, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993); see also
139 CONG. REC. 52822 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). It is
designed to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not support religion-based
exemptions from criminal laws of general applicability). For a discussion and analysis of
the proposed legislation, see Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits,
79 VA. L. REV. 1, 52-66 (1993).
72. See LAURENCE M. TRmE, AMRIcAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW, §§ 14-4 to 14-5 (2d
ed. 1988) (discussing forbidden, permissible, and required religious accommodation).
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- as it would if the school principal told the teacher that he must
hide all signs of his religion even if they were unobtrusive and
even if his religion commanded him to display them - discretion
has exceeded its constitutional warrant. It would be salutary for
courts to begin crafting principles to guide administrators between
the zone of Establishment Clause discretion and the demands of
individual rights under other, competing clauses. Indeed, such developments would prove far more productive of a healthy churchstate regime than overstated pronouncements, judicial or otherwise,
that a wicked old decision at last is dead.

